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Abstract 
The present study took an individual differences approach to understand how variation in 
interoceptive sensitivity and emotion concept knowledge interact to predict variability in 
individuals’ emotional experiences.  Participants completed a heartbeat detection task as a 
measure of interoceptive or inner bodily sensitivity, an emotion category rating task as a measure 
of emotion concept knowledge, and reported what and how intensely they experienced different 
emotions during a negative affect induction using the Trier Social Stress Task. Findings 
demonstrated that both interoceptive sensitivity and emotion concept knowledge were correlated 
with the kinds and intensity of emotions that individuals reported experiencing during the Trier. 
These findings suggest that emotional experiences are, in part, rooted in how aware individuals 
are of bodily changes and how they interpret those bodily signals using emotion concept 
knowledge. Additionally, interoceptive sensitivity and emotion concept knowledge were 
correlated with several positive emotional skills indicative of emotional complexity. Future 
studies should focus on the study’s implications for customized therapy treatments, where 
patients could improve their concept knowledge of their body and emotions and their 
interoceptive sensitivity, which in turn may support improved emotional and health outcomes. 
 
Keywords: emotion, emotion knowledge, interoception, conceptualization, psychological 
construction 
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Previous literature on the nature of emotion suggests that the body is a fundamental element of 
emotion experience (Lindquist et al., 2012; Oosterwijk et al., 2012; for review, see Harrison & 
Critchley, 2009). More specifically, a growing body of evidence demonstrates that changes in the 
body’s internal state produces changes in emotion experience (for review, see MacCormack & 
Lindquist, in press). Viewing the body as constitutive of emotion is consistent with a 
psychological constructionist approach to emotion, which frames emotions as mental states that 
emerge from the combination of more basic elements just as different ingredients such as flour, 
water, salt, and sugar can combine to make a cake vs. bread vs. cookies (see discussions in 
Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, 2013). However, little work has addressed how individual differences 
in the embodiment of emotion predict differences in the intensity and types of emotions that 
people experience. If emotions are indeed the product of more basic elements, then alterations to 
any one of those components (either due to individual differences or experimental manipulation) 
should alter the resultant emotion.  
In the present study, I extend the psychological constructionist view that the body is 
constitutive for emotion by examining how individual differences in two different body-relevant 
elements create variation in participants’ emotions. Specifically, I hypothesize that individual 
differences in interoceptive sensitivity (how accurately individuals can detect inner bodily 
changes) and their interoceptive emotion concept knowledge, linking bodily sensations with 
specific discrete emotions, will together predict differences in the intensity of discrete emotions 
and somatic sensations that participants report experiencing during a negative affect induction.  
Psychological Constructionism and the Conceptual Act Theory 
The psychological constructionist model of emotion suggests that emotions are mental states 
built from more basic psychological processes, such as (1) representations of the body’s internal 
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state (also known as core affect), which can be experienced as pleasant vs. unpleasant and high 
vs. low arousal; (2) exteroceptive sensations that provide situational feedback about the 
environment (e.g., vision or auditory input); (3) concept knowledge which is derived from both 
semantic knowledge through language, interpersonal communication, and episodic knowledge 
accumulated via personal experiences and also (4) executive functioning, such as endogenous 
and exogenous attention; and even (5) interoceptive sensitivity, how accurately and easily you 
can detect bodily changes (e.g. heart beats) (for review of these various elements, see Lindquist, 
2013; Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015).  
One particular psychological constructionist model, the Conceptual Act Theory (CAT), 
suggests that emotion experiences are constructed when people make meaning of their internal 
and external sensations using their conceptual knowledge in light of the current situation—a 
process known as situated conceptualization (Barrett, 2015; Lindquist, MacCormack, & 
Shablack, 2015). We refer to the process of using concept knowledge to make meaning of 
internal and external sensations as situated conceptualization, because the use of concept 
knowledge to make meaning of sensations is highly situated and is made more accessible when 
primed by the present context (Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015). In the case of 
emotion, concept knowledge is used to help make the vague, potentially ambiguous sensations 
from inside the body (core affect) and outside the body (exteroceptive sensations) meaningful as 
instances of specific emotions (e.g., nervous, anger, pride, joy; Barrett et al., 2015).  The CAT 
thus pinpoints core affect or internal body representations as a key constitutive element in 
emotion: just as specific values of hue, brightness, and saturation are constitutive of perceiving 
colors such as “cardinal" versus "red” (Lindquist, 2013).   
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Contrary to the basic emotion view, where each basic emotion has a unique and 
differentiated autonomic pattern, facial expression, and behavioral reaction (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 
1992), psychological constructionism instead proposes that emotions are not discrete processes 
separate from other psychological functions, but rather emergent mental events supported by 
more domain-general psychological mechanisms. For example, there are neural network overlaps 
in emotions, bodily feelings, and thoughts, which suggest there are domain-general overlaps in 
these mental states (Oosterwijk et al., 2012). Additionally, studies have shown bodily, semantic, 
and conceptual representations are all concurrently active during emotion experiences (Lindquist 
et al., 2012). Importantly, psychological constructionism and the CAT emphasize the power of 
individual differences for creating variability in people’s emotion experiences. 
Early research has examined how individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity create 
between-subject differences in emotion experience. For example, individuals who are better at 
detecting their own heartbeats are also more likely to experience emotions as highly arousing—
that is, they are more likely to endorse experiencing emotions such as “anger,” “anxiety,” and 
“excitement” vs. “sadness,” “boredom,” and “contentment” (Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & 
Aronson, 2004; Dunn et al., 2010). Although information from the body does not automatically 
translate into feelings, some people may be more aware of shifts in core affect due to higher 
interoceptive sensitivity, and this sensitivity may be one moderator linking bodily changes to 
emotion experience. Durlik, Brown & Tsakiris’s (2013) research also supports these findings, 
which shows that those with higher interoceptive sensitivity report feeling more stressed and 
negative during the Trier Social Stress Task.  Additionally, they showed that speech anticipation 
brought about heightened interoceptive awareness, and participants became more accurate at 
detecting their heartbeats when in the anxiety-provoking situation (Durlik et al., 2013). 
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However, no research to date has examined how individual differences in interoceptive 
emotion concept knowledge—that is, the conceptual associations between bodily sensations and 
discrete emotion categories--may create differences between people’s emotional lives. The 
content of emotion concept knowledge likely covers three primary domains of experience: not 
just interoceptive or bodily associations, but also behavioral and situational associations for 
different emotion categories. The content of these associations or concept knowledge likely 
varies depending on personal experience (from an early age into old age), culture, and even 
semantic associations acquired through language (e.g., “she went cold with fear”). An individual 
who associates anxiety with gastrointestinal sensations may be more likely to make the situated 
conceptualization that they are feeling anxious when their body presents this symptom, than if a 
person strongly associates a racing heart with anxiety. The present study extends previous work 
on individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity by examining how emotion concept 
knowledge about bodily sensations can predict individuals’ experienced discrete emotions and 
somatic sensations—and how this concept knowledge interacts with individual differences in 
interoceptive sensitivity. 
The Present Study 
The psychological constructionist approach provides a theoretical framework for 
exploring these embodied individual differences and how they might impact emotion experience. 
The present study examines how interoceptive sensitivity (using a heartbeat detection paradigm) 
and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge may independently and together predict how 
intensely individuals report their emotions to be during the Trier Social Stress Task (TSST).  
Specifically, I hypothesized that individuals who exhibit greater interoceptive sensitivity and 
greater interoceptive emotion concept knowledge will report experiencing more intense, high-
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION 
	  
8	  
arousal emotions (such as anger, anxiety, fear, and stress) during the TSST.  Interoceptive 
emotion concept knowledge may moderate the impact of interoceptive sensitivity on emotion 
experience, such that individuals with a paucity of interoceptive associations for emotions may 
experience less intense emotions, even if they are high on interoceptive sensitivity. Additionally, 
because this study is a preliminary first step towards developing future studies and experiments 
on individual differences on the embodiment of emotion, I explored how other factors might 
relate to interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge, such as self-
reported body awareness, trait emotional clarity and emotional complexity, positive health 
behaviors, and individuals’ alexithymic and somatization tendencies.   
Methods 
Participants 
35 PSYC 101 students (M age= 19 years; 56% female) participated in a two-session 
study for research credit. Due to peripheral psychophysiological data collection in both Session 1 
and 2, and contraindications associated with the Trier Social Stress Task (TSST) in Session 2, we 
implemented several exclusion criteria through prescreening.  First, participants with a BMI over 
33 were excluded because this weight or higher can impede the accuracy of psychophysiological 
sensors. Participants with mental health diagnoses such as mood disorders and social anxiety 
disorder were also excluded due to the nature of the TSST. In the present sample, 3 participants 
indicated that they had previously been diagnosed with an eating disorder or were significantly 
struggling with body image issues. We chose to include these individuals in the final sample, 
although it should be noted that individuals with eating disorders may have significantly poorer 
interoceptive sensitivity (Pollatos et al. 2008). 
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On the day of both sessions’ lab visits, participants did not consume caffeine, sugary 
drinks, alcohol, nicotine, or drugs less than three hours prior to their lab arrival. Participants also 
refrained from eating a heavy meal or doing moderate to high intensity physical exercise at least 
one hour or less prior to their lab arrival. These exclusions were to ensure that participants’ 
psychophysiology approximated their average baseline. Participants who failed to fulfill these 
session-specific requirements were rescheduled for a later date to maintain participant retention. 
Design 
This was a correlational study across two sessions that measured embodied individual 
differences as predictors of emotion experience. During the first session, participants completed 
a heartbeat detection task (our measure of interoceptive sensitivity), an emotion concept 
knowledge-rating task, and questionnaires for our other individual difference measures. During 
the second session at least two weeks later, participants completed the TSST and self-reported 
which emotions and somatic sensations they experienced during the TSST and how intensely 
they experienced those emotions and somatic sensations.  
Session 1 Measures 
Heartbeat detection task (HBD task; Barrett et al., 2004). As an objective measure of 
participants’ interoceptive sensitivity, participants completed a modified Whitehead HBD task 
during the first session. In this task, the experimenter first collected EKG data to get a measure 
of participants’ actual heart rate using Mindware’s BioLab program. EKG was measured by 
recording the electrical activity of the heart over a period of time using electrodes placed on a 
patient's body (Bernston, Quigley, & Lozano, 2007). However, in the present paper, I did not 
examine participants’ EKG data. Next, using Matlab, the experimenter generated a HBD task 
individualized to the participants’ actual heartbeat. Participants then watched a computer screen 
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and listened through headphones for the random presentation of a tone. Participants judged (and 
responded via the keyboard) whether the tone in that trial occurred during their heartbeat or 
between heartbeats. Participants completed 2 practice trials first and then 60 experimental trials 
of heartbeat detection, as validated by Kleckner and colleagues (2015) who demonstrated that 60 
trials is the ideal number of trials to have sufficient power to detect an individual’s accuracy on 
the task. To compute my final measure of interoceptive sensitivity, I used participants’ 
percentage of trials correct (which takes into account participants’ hits, misses, and false alarms) 
as a weighted single score. 
Emotion concept knowledge. To measure participants’ conceptual knowledge about 
emotion, participants rated the extent to which they associated 60 different interoceptive (e.g., 
“heart racing” or “goosebumps”), behavioral (e.g., “punching” or “running away”), or 
situational (e.g., “harm” or “injustice”) properties with discrete emotion categories (Anger, 
Sadness, Anxiety, Embarrassment, & Boredom) using a Likert scale (1=not at all associated to 
6=extremely associated). The interoceptive properties were picked because they may be ones 
that participants experienced during the TSST.  All of the sensations listed on the Somatic 
Sensations report (that participants completed during Session 2 after the TSST) were included as 
interoceptive properties in this task. This task also included reaction time as a behavioral 
measure of individuals’ strength of association, but reaction time was not analyzed in the present 
paper. For analyses, I created mean scores from participants’ likert ratings across all emotion 
concepts for the three different kinds of emotion properties, resulting in mean interoceptive, 
behavioral, and situational modality rating scores. 
Other Individual Difference Measures 
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Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ; Shields, Mallory, and Simon, 1989; 𝛼= .83). To 
measure how interoceptive or bodily-focused individuals think they are (known as interoceptive 
sensibility; Garfinkel et al., 2013), participants completed the Body Awareness Questionnaire. It 
included 18 items designed to assess self-reported attentiveness to normal non-emotive body 
processes—specifically, sensitivity to body cycles and rhythms, the ability to detect small 
changes in normal functioning, and the ability to anticipate bodily reactions. The participant 
answered how well a statement described them on a Likert scale (1=not at all to 7= completely). 
For this measure, I created a standardized mean score to use in analyses. Previous researchers 
have suggested but not tested whether accurate heartbeat detection (interoceptive sensitivity) 
positively correlates with self-reported body awareness (i.e., BAQ). I hypothesized that both 
interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge would positively correlate 
with participants’ self-reports on the BAQ, such that those who think they are more aware of 
their bodies, would actually be more interoceptive as demonstrated on the HBD task and would 
also have stronger bodily associations for emotion categories. 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2012; 𝛼= .90). As another measure of interoceptive sensibility, participants completed the MAIA, 
which is a 32-item multidimensional assessment of participants’ self-reported awareness of body 
sensations, emotional reactions and attention response to body sensations, capacity to regulate 
attention, awareness of mind-body integration, and trust of body sensations. An example of a 
question is “When I am tense, I notice where the tension is located in my body.” The participant 
answered how well each statement described them on a Likert scale (1=not at all to 
7=completely). I created a standardized mean score to use in analyses. Again, I hypothesized that 
both interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge would positively 
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correlate with participants’ self-reports on the MAIA, such that those who think they are more 
interoceptive, would actually be more interoceptive as demonstrated on the HBD task and would 
also have stronger bodily associations for emotion categories.  
Trait emotional clarity (Mayer et al., 1995; 𝛼= .80). Individuals who are high in 
interoceptive sensitivity may have more intense emotions in part because the interoceptive 
sensitivity amplifies their emotional clarity, or the precision with which people experience their 
emotions as a specific, distinctive state compared to other states.  To measure trait emotional 
clarity, participants completed the Emotional Clarity subscale of the State-Meta Mood Scale 
(SMMS) as developed by Mayer, Salovey, Goldman, Turvey, Palfai (1995). In this measure, 
participants responded to statements such as “I am aware of the different nuances or subtleties of 
a given emotion” and “each emotion has a very distinct and unique meaning to me,” using a 
Likert scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  For this measure, I created a standardized 
mean score to use in analyses. I hypothesized that interoceptive sensitivity in particular and also 
interoceptive emotion concept knowledge would correlate positively with trait emotional clarity, 
such that those who are able to identify the distinction between emotion possibly have a better 
emotion concept knowledge, or are more interoceptive, or both. Trait emotional clarity should 
also be correlated with participants’ intensity of emotions and somatic sensations reported from 
the Trier Social Stress Task. 
Range and Differentiation in Emotion Experience Scale (RDEES; Kang & Shaver, 2004; 𝛼= .79). Individuals who are high in interoceptive sensitivity and who have strong associations 
for different emotion modalities with emotion categories may also have more intense and 
distinctive emotions in part because both of these factors may lead individuals over time to 
become more emotionally complex—that is, to experience a greater variety of distinct emotions 
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rather than ambiguous states of feeling “good” vs. “bad”1.  To measure trait emotional 
complexity, participants completed the RDEES. This scale was used to determine individual 
differences in emotional complexity. Items on the scale included statements such as: “I 
experience a wide range of emotions” and “I am aware of the subtle difference between feelings 
I have” where participants rated their agreement with the statements on a Likert scale 
(1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree). I created a standardized mean score to use in analyses. 
I hypothesized that interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge will 
both correlate positively with trait emotional complexity, such that individuals who report 
experiencing a broad range of distinct emotions are also more likely to also demonstrate greater 
interoceptive sensitivity and emotion concept knowledge.  
Self-reported health behaviors. Participants completed a brief questionnaire on their 
sleep, eating, and exercise habits. They rated their health behaviors on the following questions: 
“How well do you sleep at night?” “How healthy do you think you eat most of the time?” and 
“How frequently do you complete the following exercises?” using a Likert scale (1=not at 
all/never to 5=extremely/every time).  For the latter question, participants rated exercise 
frequency for the following exercises: moderate physical activity, vigorous physical activity, 
yoga, martial arts, sports, meditation/mindfulness, and prayer. For analyses, I created a health 
behaviors mean by standardizing and then averaging together participants’ responses to the 
above questions. I hypothesized that interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept 
knowledge will correlate positively with better health behaviors, such that individuals 
performing better health behaviors (e.g. more exercising, better sleep and eating habits) also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Although it could also be the reverse causal direction, where individuals who start out having a diversity of 
distinctive emotions are better able to develop interoceptive sensitivity and greater emotion concept knowledge.  
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likely possess greater interoceptive concept knowledge and interoceptive sensitivity, where being 
more knowledgeable and sensitive to the body might increase through engaging in better health 
behaviors or the reverse, where the act of improving one’s health and health practices could 
augment one’s interoceptive concept knowledge and interoceptive sensitivity.  
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1993; 𝛼=.80). 
Alexithymia refers to difficulty identifying and describing emotions and the tendency to 
minimize emotion experience and focus attention externally (Mattila et al., 2008). Alexithymia 
could be related to poorer interoceptive sensitivity or a paucity of emotion concept knowledge. 
Additionally alexithymia could confound participants’ emotion ratings from the Trier Social 
Stress Test in Session 2. To control for any alexithymic tendencies in our sample, participants 
completed the abbreviated Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20). The TAS-20 is a well-
validated, standard measure of alexithymia, and includes 20 items with three subcategories: the 
Difficulty Describing Feelings subscale included 5 items, the Difficulty Identifying Feeling 
subscale included 7 items, and the Externally-Oriented Thinking subscale included 8 items as a 
measure of individuals’ tendency to focus their attention externally rather than internally. 
Examples of questions include: “When asked which emotion I'm feeling, I frequently don't know 
the answer” or “I'm unsure of which words to use when describing my feelings”; participants 
used a Likert scale to rate their agreement with each statement (1=strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree). I created a standardized mean score to use in analyses. I hypothesized that 
interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge would correlate 
negatively with alexithymia, such that those who are not alexithymic (i.e., can identity their 
emotions) are likely more interoceptive with greater emotion concept knowledge.  
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Common Mental Disorders Questionnaire (CMDSQ; Sogaard & Bech, 2009; 𝛼=.87). 
The CMDQ includes 32-items that cover somatization disorder, anxiety, and depression. For 
example, the questionnaire asked participants to rate how often they were bothered with a variety 
of somatic complaints in the past four weeks (e.g., headaches; dizziness or faintness; pains in 
heart or chest) as a measure of somatization. Participants also rated their beliefs and concerns 
about having an illness that the doctors cannot identify, as a measure of hypochondriasis. I 
included these measures in the study to ensure that participants were not rating more intense 
somatic sensations during the Trier because of their somatization tendencies. Participants rate 
how much they agreed with each statement on a Likert scale (0=not at all to 4=extremely). We 
used this measure to exclude participants who may have had any of these disorders. I created a 
standardized mean score to use in analyses. I hypothesized that interoceptive sensitivity and 
interoceptive emotion concept knowledge would correlate negatively with somatization 
tendencies. Individuals who somaticize are possibly too extremely interoceptive (or not 
interoceptive enough), and demonstrate a paucity of interoceptive concept knowledge, thus 
explaining why these individuals cannot differentiate what really is an emotion or illness.  
Demographics. Finally demographics were collected (age, gender, race/ethnicity, and 
perceived socioeconomic status). 
Session 2 Measures 
Psychophysiological measures. Electrocardiography (EKG), cardiac impedance, and 
blood pressure were measured prior to and during the TSST. EKG is measured by recording the 
electrical activity of the heart over a period of time using electrodes placed on a patient's body 
(Bernston, Quigley, & Lozano, 2007). Cardiac impedance was measured with sensors to detect 
the properties of blood flow in the thorax. It did this by measuring the baseline and 
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corresponding change in impedance (Brownley, Hurwitz, & Schneirderman, 2000). Blood 
pressure is measured by systolic (maximum) pressure over diastolic (minimum) pressure and is 
measured in millimeters of mercury (mm Hg) (Bernston et al., 2007). This is done with a cuff 
over the upper arm, above the antecubital fossa. To collect psychophysiological data, we used 
Mindware’s BioLab program. However, in the present paper, I do not further report on 
peripheral physiological data. 
Trier Social Stress Task (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993). To serve as our negative 
mood induction, we used the TSST. In our version of the TSST, participants had 2 minutes to 
prepare a speech where he or she convinces a panel that they are the best candidate for a career 
position (one the participant would genuinely like to get one day).  Once the 2 minutes were 
done, a panel of two interviewers entered the room and “judged” (seemingly appear to write 
notes and provide neutral affective feedback) while the participant gave their speech for 10 
minutes. The participant then completed a difficult mathematical task for 5 minutes (counting 
backwards as per Kirschbaum et al, 1993). 
Birkett (2011) explains how the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) allows researchers to 
examine the biological pathways of the stress response in health and disease that are fundamental 
to stress. For this study, it allowed us to examine which emotions individuals naturally construct 
during a stressful situation and how individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity conceptual 
associations, and physiological reactivity, feed into that emotion construction to produce 
differences in emotion experience. In the present paper, I did not examine physiological 
reactivity (as measured by peripheral physiology) and instead focused on the relation between 
interoceptive emotion concept knowledge and interoceptive sensitivity. The TSST provided a 
naturalistic context by incorporating aspects of social and psychological stress and is the most 
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useful and appropriate standardized protocol for studies of stress reactivity. Thus, the TSST is a 
robust tool for inducing high arousal, negative emotional experiences. 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Circumplex PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988; 𝜶=.89). This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings 
and emotions. Participants rated “how intensely did you feel this during the task” (during the 
TSST) on a Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=extremely) for the 30 different emotions including 
happy, sad, calm, etc. For participants’ self-reported emotions after the TSST, I created a mean 
intensity score across all emotions, as well as means for high arousal vs. low arousal emotions, 
positive vs. negative emotions, and then high arousal, negative vs. high arousal positive vs. low 
arousal, negative vs. low arousal, positive emotions. These means serve as a manipulation check 
that the TSST did indeed induce high arousal, negative emotions in participants. Additionally, 
these means may serve as a valuable insight into individual differences in how individuals with 
greater interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge might be 
experiencing more intense emotions overall or more specifically, more intense negative, high 
arousal emotions during the TSST compared to individuals with less interoceptive sensitivity or 
concept knowledge.  
I hypothesized that interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept 
knowledge will interact to predict greater emotional intensity: specifically, individuals with 
higher interoceptive sensitivity may report less intense emotional experiences if they are lower in 
interoceptive emotion concept knowledge, and individuals with lower interoceptive sensitivity 
may still report more intense emotional experiences if they are higher in interoceptive emotion 
concept knowledge.  
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An Emotional Intensity score was created by taking the mean of all emotions in the 
PANAS. The Negative Emotion Mean included activated, afraid, stressed, guilty, angry, 
frustrated, panicky, embarrassed, disgusted, and distressed. The Positive Emotion Mean included 
happy, relaxed, content, pleased, amused, proud, excited, and calm. The High Arousal Negative 
Emotion Mean included activated, afraid, stressed, guilty, angry, annoyed, frustrated, panicky, 
embarrassed, hyperactive, disgusted, distressed emotions. The Low Arousal Negative Emotion 
Mean included: sad, unhappy, bored, weary emotions. The High Arousal Positive Emotion Mean 
included: activated, proud, hyperactive, alert, excited emotions.  The Low Arousal Positive 
Emotion Mean included: quiet, relaxed, content, and calm.  
Somatic Sensations Scale (𝛼=.79). The Somatic Sensations questionnaire measured 
participants self-reported bodily sensations experienced during the TSST. The scale consisted of 
a number of words that describe different bodily sensations and feelings. Participants were asked 
to rate how intensely they felt each bodily sensation during the TSST, such as heart rate 
increased, dizzy/light-headed, palms sweaty on a Likert scale (1=not at all and 7=extremely). For 
the measure of self-reported somatic sensations, I created a mean intensity score across all 
somatic sensations (called Somatic Intensity) as well as means for cardiac changes (e.g., “heart 
rate increased”), gastric changes (e.g., “pit in your stomach”), respiratory changes (e.g., “rapid 
breathing”), kinesthetic changes (e.g., “knots” “limbs feeling heavy”) temperature changes (e.g., 
“cold/clammy”), and general sensations/arousal-focused changes (e.g., “drained” “wide awake”). 
I created the variety of different means to descriptively explore whether there were individual 
differences in how participants experienced their bodily changes during the TSST, and also to 
examine if these individual differences related to individual differences in interoceptive 
sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge.  
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A Somatic Intensity score was created by taking the mean of all somatic sensations in the 
Somatic Sensations Scale. For the Cardiac Mean, I used the following sensations: heart racing, 
heart pounding, blood pumping, and heart palpitations. The Gastric Mean included: stomach 
tense, pit in stomach, butterflies in stomach, sick, empty or hollow, and nausea. The Respiratory 
Mean included: rapid breathing, tight chest. The Kinesthetic Mean included: shaky, feeling 
numb, knots and muscle tension, headache, fidgety, pain, tingling limbs, shivering, stiff neck, 
feeling heavy, jittering, spine tingling. The Temperature Mean included: sweating, turning pale, 
turning red, spine tingling, cold, clammy, flush, goose bumps. Finally, the General Sensations or 
Arousal State Mean included: feeling powerful, sluggish, drained, exhausted, energized, weak, 
wide awake, weary, restless, and jittery. 
Procedures  
Session 1. Prior to lab arrival, all participants were prescreened for BMI, eating 
disorders, or mental health disorders. All participants were required to be medication free and 
refrain from smoking, physical exercise, heavy meals, alcohol, caffeine, or soda at least 1 hour 
prior to arrival. For example, individuals were instructed to wear loose clothing, not wear 
anything metal; women should not wear dresses, etc., so that it would not impede the 
psychophysiological readings. Upon arrival, the participant completed an “intake screening” that 
asked participants about the last time they ate, drank soda or caffeine, etc. to ensure that they 
were still eligible to participate in this session, then they completed informed consent, and finally 
the feelings report.  
Once consent was completed, the experimenter prepared the participant for baseline 
psychophysiological data collection. We only collected EKG here, as this was what we needed 
for the heartbeat detection task. After collecting 5 minutes of baseline EKG, participants 
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proceeded to either the heartbeat detection task or the conceptual knowledge rating task or the 
individual difference questionnaires (these three tasks were counterbalanced, as interoceptive 
sensitivity might induce participants to be more interoceptively-focused in their conceptual 
knowledge ratings or questionnaire responses—or vice versa).  
For the heartbeat detection task, participants completed a computerized task where for 
each trial, they listened to a series of 10 beeps be presented during or between their heartbeats 
(across two practice trials and 60 experimental trials) before rating on the computer whether the 
tone occurred during or between their heartbeats. For the conceptual knowledge rating task, 
participants completed the rating task on the lab computer. For this task, Eprime randomly 
selected one of 60 emotion properties (interoceptive, behavioral, or situational in nature) and 
paired it with one of 5 different discrete emotions (Anger, Sadness, Anxiety, Embarrassment, & 
Boredom) so that participants saw on their screen (for example) “How much do you associate 
heart racing with ANGER” and then the likert scale below to help guide their rating on the 
keyboard. Each property was paired once with each emotion, creating 300 trials total. 
Participants also completed the other individual difference measures via Qualtrics on the lab 
computer. All measures were randomized and counterbalanced to avoid order effects, except the 
demographics which appeared at the end.  
Session 2. Again, as per Session 1, all participants were required to be medication free 
and refrain from smoking, physical exercise, heavy meals, caffeine, alcohol, or soda at least 1 
hour prior to arrival.  Individuals were not to wear loose clothing, not wear anything metal; 
women were not to wear dresses, etc. to ensure ease of attaching sensors. The participants were 
asked to complete a new consent form for participating in the TSST (given to the participant 
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after baseline psychophysiological data collection to avoid contaminating the baseline data with 
participants’ anticipatory stress).  
Next, the experimenter prepared the participant for psychophysiological measurement 
and collected baseline data for 5 minutes—this included EKG, cardiac impedance & blood 
pressure. Once baseline data was collected, the experimenter instructed the participant on the 
next task (TSST following protocol from Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The participant had 2 
minutes to prepare a speech before giving it to a panel of judges for 10 minutes, after which they 
also complete a frustrating mathematical task for 5 minutes (counting backwards as per 
Kirschbaum et al, 1993). 
Afterwards, the participant retrospectively reported their experience on modified PANAS 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This measure showed which discrete emotion participants 
felt during the TSST and also how intensely they felt that emotion. Then the participant filled out 
the Somatic Sensations questionnaire. This provided the participant with a list of a number of 
possible somatic sensations they may have experienced. Finally, 5 minutes of recovery 
psychophysiology data was collected and participants were debriefed to the true nature of the 
study and compensated with PSYC101 subject pool credit hours. 
Results 
For this present paper, I tested the primary hypothesis that interoceptive sensitivity and 
interoceptive emotion concept knowledge will independently and jointly predict the intensity of 
emotions that individuals reported feeling during the TSST, such that interoceptive emotion 
concept knowledge will moderate the relation between interoceptive sensitivity and emotional 
intensity.  Additionally, as this study is a preliminary study to future work, I explored several 
individual differences relevant to emotional intensity, interoceptive sensitivity, and emotion 
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concept knowledge: chiefly, I examined how self-reported body awareness, trait emotional 
clarity and emotional complexity, health behaviors, and alexithymia and somatization tendencies 
were related to each other and also to participants’ interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive 
emotion concept knowledge from Session 1 and participants’ self-reported emotions and somatic 
sensations from the TSST during Session 2. 
Analysis Plan. First, I ran descriptives on all my variables to ensure that my measures 
were normally distributed and did not exhibit any problematic skew or kurtosis. Second, I ran 
several bivariate correlations to explore the relations between interoceptive sensitivity, the three 
different types of emotion concept knowledge (interoceptive, behavioral, and situational), my 
other individual difference measures, and the mean emotion and somatic sensation ratings. 
Finally, using multiple regression, I tested the main effects and interaction for interoceptive 
sensitivity and interoceptive emotion concept knowledge on individuals’ self-reported emotional 
intensity during the TSST (Model 1). Additionally, I ran a model that included behavioral 
emotion concept knowledge (Model 2) and a model that included situational emotion concept 
knowledge (Model 3) as moderators of interoceptive sensitivity on emotional intensity to 
determine if the effects of interoceptive emotion concept knowledge were specific to that kind of 
emotion concept knowledge or if any kind of greater emotion concept knowledge might more 
generally impact this relation.  
Descriptives. Descriptives and frequencies for each emotion and somatic sensation are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2.  Of note, participants reported experiencing positive and low arousal 
emotions with the least intensity: for example, they reported relatively low levels of happy 
(M=1.65), guilty (M=1.12), and sad (M=1.24), suggesting that most participants did not 
experience these emotions during the TSST. However, participants were more likely to rate 
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emotions such as “embarrassed” and “frustrated” highly during the TSST (Ms= 3.12, 3.65 
respectively) with “stressed” and “anxious” being rated as the most intense emotions participants 
experienced during the TSST (Ms= 4.00, 4.06 respectively). These findings serve as a 
manipulation check ensuring that the TSST did indeed induce negative, high arousal emotions.  
For somatic sensations, participants most highly rated feeling their blood pumping (M= 
3.24), feeling fidgety (M= 3.88), feeling their heart rate increase (M= 3.88), feeling jittery (M= 
3.71), and feeling wide awake (M= 3.00), again indicators that participants experienced a state of 
high arousal during the TSST. See Table 1 for all emotions and somatic sensation means, range, 
and standard deviations.  
With regard to frequencies, participants most frequently reported experiencing emotions 
such as stress, panic, irritability, frustration, anxiety, embarrassment, distress, annoyance, and 
anger—of which anxiety was the most frequent emotion. For somatic sensations, participants 
most frequently reported feeling their blood pumping, feeling butterflies in their stomachs, 
feeling cold or clammy, feeling fidgety, feeling their heart rate increasing, feeling their heart 
pounding in their chest, feeling jittery, feeling a pit in their stomach, feeling restless, sweating 
more, and feeling wide awake during the TSST. All other somatic sensations were also reported 
by some individuals, except no participant reported having a headache. See Table 2 for all 
emotions and somatic sensation frequencies. Means and other descriptives for all other variables 
are presented in Table 3.  
Score frequencies for the HBD task, my measure of interoceptive sensitivity, are 
presented in Table 4. Half of the participants had accuracy rates between 50-70% (above 
chance), but only 17% of the participants scored above 70% on the heartbeat detection task, with 
one individual scoring as highly as 91% accurate. These frequencies show how most participants 
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were moderately successful at detecting changes in their body, but that we also had a good 
distribution of individuals who were poor at heartbeat detection or above average.  
Bivariate Correlations. Next, I examined the inter- and intra-correlations of my variables 
of interest. All correlations are presented in Tables 5-8.  
In Table 5, I present bivariate correlations for my primary predictors of interest: 
participants’ HBD score, interoceptive vs. behavioral vs. situational concept knowledge, and 
mean BAQ and MAIA scores. Participants’ HBD score was significantly related to participants’ 
behavioral concept knowledge (r= .368, p= .045) and marginally related to participants’ 
interoceptive and situational concept knowledge (rs= .306, .332, ps= .100, .073). However, of 
interest, participants’ HBD scores were not significantly related to their BAQ or MAIA self-
reported body awareness means, although the BAQ and MAIA were moderately intra-correlated 
with each other (r= .496, p=.003). This suggests that just because someone thinks that they are 
highly aware of and sensitive to their bodily changes does not necessarily mean that they are 
more accurate at detecting those changes. For the different kinds of emotion concept knowledge, 
all items were highly intra-correlated: Interoceptive with Behavioral (r= .942, p< .0001), 
Interoceptive with Situational (r= .894, p<. 0001), and Behavioral with Situational (r=.888, p< 
.0001). However, neither the BAQ nor the MAIA means were significantly correlated with any 
of the kinds of emotion concept knowledge.  
Next, in Table 6, I present bivariate correlations of my predictors with the other 
individual difference measures: mean emotional clarity, the RDEES emotional complexity mean, 
mean health behaviors, mean alexithymia, and mean somatization. Participants’ HBD scores 
were not significantly correlated with any of these individual differences. However, the BAQ 
was marginally correlated with Mean Health Behaviors (r= .322, p= .063), suggesting that 
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people who reported greater body awareness on the BAQ were marginally more likely to engage 
in positive health behaviors. Additionally, participants’ mean MAIA score was significantly 
correlated with the RDEES mean (r= .423, p= .013), suggesting that the more interoceptive 
individuals thought they were, the more emotionally complex they also rated themselves as 
being. Additionally, individuals high on the MAIA were less likely to be alexithymic (r= -.430, 
p= .011), suggesting that the more interoceptive individuals thought they were, the less 
alexithymic they reported being. Both participants’ Interoceptive and Behavioral emotion 
concept knowledge marginally correlated with participants’ RDEES mean (rs= .328, .317, ps= 
.058, .068 respectively), suggesting that individuals who think of themselves as more 
emotionally complex associated interoceptive and behavioral properties more strongly with 
emotion concepts. Situational emotion concept knowledge did not correlate with any of the 
individual difference measures.  
Participants who rated themselves as having greater emotional clarity also rated 
themselves as more emotionally complex (r= .470, p= .005) and as less alexithymic (p= -.553, 
p= .001). Individuals who rated themselves as more emotionally complex also reported being 
less alexithymic (r= -.484, p= .004). Mean health behaviors and mean somatization tendencies 
were not correlated with any other individual differences however.  
In Table 7, I present bivariate correlations of my main predictors of interest from Session 
1 with my main dependent variables of interest from Session 2 (emotions and somatic 
sensations). Participants’ HBD score correlated highly with participants’ emotional experience 
and somatic sensations. For example, HBD accuracy was correlated with Mean Emotional 
Intensity (r= .569, p=.022), Mean High Arousal Emotions (r=. 606, p=.013), Mean Negative 
Emotions (r=.550, p=.027), and Mean High Arousal, Negative Emotions (r=.625, p=.010). 
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HBD accuracy was not correlated with low arousal or positive emotion states. Additionally, 
HBD accuracy was correlated with Mean Somatic Intensity (r= .531 p=.034) overall, as well as 
Mean Gastric Changes (r= .443, p= .085), Mean Respiratory Changes (r= .550 p= .027), Mean 
Kinesthetic Changes (r= .605 p=.013), and Mean General Affective Changes (r = .443, p= .086).  
Notably, the BAQ and MAIA did not significantly correlate with any aspect of 
participants’ emotions or somatic sensations (although the MAIA did marginally predict 
Respiratory Changes: r= -.480, p= .051).  
For participants’ emotion concept knowledge ratings, I found that Interoceptive concept 
knowledge was correlated with participants’ Mean Emotional Intensity, Mean High Arousal 
Emotions, Mean Negative Emotions, and Mean High Arousal, Negative Emotions (rs= .657, 
.616, .520, .638, ps= .004, .008, .033, .006). Interoceptive concept knowledge also correlated 
with participants’ Mean Somatic Intensity, Mean Cardiac Changes, Mean Kinesthetic Changes, 
and Mean General Affective Changes (rs= .604, .515, .644, .702, ps= .010, .034, .005, .002). 
Behavioral concept knowledge was also correlated with participants’ Mean Emotional Intensity, 
Mean High Arousal Emotions, Mean Negative Emotions, and Mean High Arousal, Negative 
Emotions (rs= .733, .681, .620, .710, ps= .001, .003, .008, .001). Behavioral concept knowledge 
also correlated with participants’ Mean Somatic Intensity, Mean Cardiac Changes, Mean Gastric 
Changes, Mean Kinesthetic Changes, and Mean General Affective Changes (rs= .706, .572, .480, 
.751, .719, ps= .002, .016, .051, .001, .001). Finally, Situational concept knowledge also 
correlated with participants’ Mean Emotional Intensity, Mean High Arousal Emotions, Mean 
Negative Emotions, and Mean High Arousal, Negative Emotions (rs= .609, .561, .499, .605, ps= 
.009, .019, .041, .010) and participants’ Mean Somatic Intensity, Mean Kinesthetic Changes, and 
Mean General Affective Changes (rs= .585, .638, .632, ps= .014, .006, .006). Overall, 
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Behavioral concept knowledge showed the largest correlations (r-values) with participants’ 
reported emotions and somatic sensations. 
Finally, in Table 8, I present bivariate correlations for the various individual difference 
measures with participants’ emotions and somatic sensations in Session 2. Trait emotional clarity 
was significantly and marginally associated with a variety of different aspects to participants’ 
emotions and somatic sensations: less positive emotions (r= -.462, p= .062), less low arousal, 
positive emotions (r= -.472, p= .056), greater somatic intensity (r= .552, p= .021), greater 
gastric changes (r= .665, p= .004), as well as marginally greater cardiac, respiratory, kinesthetic, 
and temperature changes (rs= .449, .438, .467, .472, ps= .071, .079, .059, .056). Neither 
participants’ self-rated emotional complexity (RDEES) nor their mean health behaviors 
significantly correlated with any aspects of emotion experience or somatic sensations during the 
TSST. However, participants who were higher on somatization (albeit not at clinical levels) were 
more likely to report marginally greater emotional intensity (r= .434, p= .082) and significantly 
more intense low arousal emotions (r= .636, p= .006) but no correlations with somatic 
sensations. This may suggest that individuals with somatization tendencies are amplifying their 
low arousal states, although somatization was not correlated with HBD accuracy, suggesting that 
this amplification is not related to actual greater interoceptive sensitivity. Finally, individuals 
with alexithymic tendencies did not report any significant differences in emotion experience, 
emotional or somatic intensity, but did report less intense General Affective changes (e.g., 
indicators of arousal such as exhausted, drained, energized, weary, etc.) compared to individuals 
low in alexithymic tendencies (r= -.483, p= .049). 
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Regression Analyses. I ran three regression models to test the main effects and 
interactive effects of interoceptive sensitivity (HBD accuracy) with the three kinds of emotion 
concept knowledge on emotional intensity. Table 9 lists all model results.  
Model 1: HBD, Interoceptive CK, and HBD x Interoceptive CK on Emotional Intensity. 
The main effect of heartbeat detection ability on participants’ self-reported emotional intensity 
was not significant (B= -.175, p= .962). There was no significant main effect of interoceptive 
concept knowledge on emotional intensity (B= .111, p= .840), nor was the interaction significant 
(r=.535, p= 637).  
Model 2: HBD, Behavioral CK, and HBD x Behavioral CK on Emotional Intensity. The 
main effect of heartbeat detection ability on participants’ self-reported emotional intensity was 
not significant (B= .375, p= .903). There was no significant main effect of behavioral concept 
knowledge on emotional intensity (B= .272, p= .556), nor was the interaction significant (r=.221, 
p= .801).  
Model 3: HBD, Situational CK, and HBD x Situational CK on Emotional Intensity. The 
main effect of heartbeat detection ability on participants’ self-reported emotional intensity was 
not significant (B= - .719, p= .863). There was no significant main effect of situational concept 
knowledge on emotional intensity (B= -.006, p= .993), nor was the interaction significant 
(r=.660, p= .593). 
Discussion 
The results show interoceptive sensitivity and emotion concept knowledge correlate 
positively with individuals’ emotional intensity and even their somatic intensity during the 
TSST. These findings are consistent with previous research. According to Barrett et al. (2004), 
people who were more sensitive to their heartbeats emphasized feelings of activation and 
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deactivation when reporting their experiences of emotion more than those who were less 
sensitive. Studies have shown findings consistent with a constructionist model, that a 
combination of large-scale distributed networks contributes to emotions, thoughts, and bodily 
feelings (Oosterwijk et al., 2012). Moreover, according to the psychological constructionist 
Conceptual Act Theory, emotion is constructed when information from one’s body is made 
meaningful in the present situation using concept knowledge about emotion (Lindquist, 
MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015).  
Specifically, the present study’s results support the idea that individuals with greater 
interoceptive sensitivity experience their emotions and accompanying somatic sensations as 
more intense, arousal-focused, and even more negative during the TSST than individuals who 
are lower in interoceptive sensitivity. The results showed that those with better HBD scores (our 
measure of interoceptive sensitivity) also reported higher emotional intensity during TSST. 
Interoceptive, behavioral and situational concept knowledge were each correlated with emotional 
intensity during TSST, and specifically with high-arousal emotions. 
Additionally, for emotion concept knowledge, the bivariate correlations suggest that 
having greater emotion concept knowledge—no matter what kind—was correlated with greater 
emotional intensity, more high-arousal, negative emotions, and greater somatic intensity during 
the TSST. However, contrary to my original predictions, it was behavioral emotion concept 
knowledge, rather than interoceptive emotion concept knowledge, that had the strongest 
correlation with interoceptive sensitivity and emotion intensity. This may be because these 
behaviors are learned associations between personal/observed behaviors and emotions, thus they 
are more relevant to individuals. It may also imply that more arousal focused emotions, such as 
anger or stressed are often accompanied with observable behaviors, such as clenching fists, vs. 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION 
	  
30	  
low arousal emotions such as bored or content, which are emotions that are accompanied with 
behaviors that are not as salient to the individual. These results are also consistent with 
individuals being more expressive about negative emotions versus positive emotions; and how 
negative emotions tend to be more complex than positive emotions (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008).  
Although no single regression in this thesis demonstrated significant main effects or 
interactions, this is likely due to small sample size. For example, interoceptive sensitivity and 
behavioral concept knowledge are both significantly correlated with emotional intensity, and 
interoceptive and situational concept knowledge are marginally associated with emotional 
intensity. These correlations suggest that the proposed moderation of interoceptive sensitivity by 
emotion concept knowledge may still be possible. However, it may be that my original 
hypothesis of interoceptive emotion concept knowledge as a moderator of the relation between 
interoceptive sensitivity and emotional intensity may not bear out. However, caution should be 
used when interpreting these current findings as the small sample size may lead to false positive 
or false negatives. Future research with a larger sample size is needed to verify whether the 
nonsignificant regression effects hold or if any specific kind of emotion concept knowledge 
moderates interoceptive sensitivity’s impact on emotional intensity. In future, researchers could 
also examine participants’ implicit associations for the different emotion modalities with emotion 
concepts (using reaction times): it may be that participants’ explicit ratings are less predictive 
than their implicit ratings, which may better tap into their emotion concept knowledge.  
Strengths and Limitations. 
Importantly, these results are preliminary due to the small sample size. The fact that none 
of the interactions were significant is likely due to such a small sample size. Future data 
collection is needed to eliminate any potentially spurious findings and to properly clarify the true 
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relations of these embodied individual differences on emotion experience. Another limitation to 
this study is the participants’ demographics. Ideally, the sample would include diverse ethnic 
groups, with a wider range of ages, levels of education and socioeconomic status. For example, 
these findings may differ for older adult populations or might differ based on ethnicity or income 
and education level. However, one of the biggest strengths of this study is the individual 
differences approach taken, which opens up new pathways of research for solving why people 
experience emotions differently. 
Future Directions. 
Future work will examine how individual differences in physiological reactivity relate to 
interoceptive sensitivity and emotion concept knowledge. For example, with the addition of 
physiological reactivity, we could determine if the combination of higher physiological reactivity 
and interoceptive sensitivity could be problematic for a person. It could lead to overgeneralizing 
any response they experience and lead to higher stress, mental disorders, or health problems.  
Ultimately, these findings could benefit patient outcomes. Essentially, the knowledge of 
patients’ high physiological reactivity and their high interoceptive sensitivity could be utilized 
for customized treatment options for these patients. Additionally, clinical research indicates that 
retraining attention for threat-related stimuli can reduce anxiety symptoms (Amir et al., 2008). 
Research done by Sze et al (2010) has shown that body awareness training can have an impact, 
such as meditators had the highest levels of coherence between the subjective and physiological 
aspects of emotion and controls having lowest levels.  
Potentially, there can be customized therapy treatments that would help patients change 
their conceptual knowledge of their body, which could lead to less emotion constructions. 
Further studies could implement the findings in a therapeutic setting, where patients can use their 
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conceptual knowledge and physiological responses in order to become increasingly aware of 
their emotion construction and better deal with stressful or anxiety provoking situations.  
According to the psychological constructionist Conceptual Act Theory, emotion is 
constructed when information from one’s body is made meaningful in the present situation using 
concept knowledge about emotion (Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015). Future work 
should explore whether individuals with a paucity of conceptual knowledge about body’s role in 
emotion can be trained. For example, research by Jamieson et al. (2010), showed that changing 
an individual’s current categorization of unpleasant high arousal state (e.g. testing anxiety) 
through reappraisal can lead to a positive high arousal state (e.g., excitement). In other words, 
although interoceptive sensitivity clearly matters for how intensely individuals experience their 
emotions to be, it may be individuals’ interpretations of those bodily signals as valuable or 
dangerous, as a sign of excitement vs. anxiety—guided by their emotion concept knowledge--
that can ultimately determine the difference between an individual who is emotionally well-
adjusted vs. an individual struggling with depression, anxiety, or panic disorders. I look forward 
to future research testing this hypothesis. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for self-reported emotions and somatic sensations 
experienced during the Trier.  
Self Reported 
Experience 
Mean Min Max SD 
Emotions 
     Activated 3.24 1 6 1.602 
     Afraid 1.82 1 6 1.468 
     Alert 3.88 1 7 1.616 
     Amused 2.12 1 6 1.654 
     Angry 2.00 1 6 1.414 
     Annoyed 3.24 1 7 2.166 
     Anxious 4.06 1 7 1.919 
     Bored 2.47 1 7 2.004 
     Calm 2.24 1 5 1.147 
     Content 1.71 1 4 0.920 
     Disgusted 1.35 1 3 0.702 
     Distressed 2.71 1 6 1.724 
     Embarrassed 3.12 1 7 1.996 
     Excited 2.00 1 4 1.061 
     Frustrated 3.65 2 7 1.730 
     Guilty 1.12 1 2 0.332 
     Happy 1.65 1 4 0.862 
     Hyperactive 2.24 1 5 1.251 
     Interested 2.18 1 4 1.237 
     Irritable 2.88 1 6 2.058 
     Panicky 2.94 1 7 1.749 
     Pleased 1.65 1 4 0.996 
     Proud 2.00 1 6 1.275 
     Quiet 1.41 1 5 1.176 
     Relaxed 1.76 1 4 0.970 
     Sad 1.24 1 4 0.752 
     Sleepy 2.06 1 4 1.144 
     Stressed 4.00 1 7 1.936 
     Unhappy 2.41 1 7 1.906 
     Weary 2.00 1 4 1.118 
Somatic Sensations 
     Blood Pumping 3.24 1 6 2.078 
     Butterflies in stomach 2.12 1 5 1.317 
     Cold  or clammy 2.47 1 7 1.940 
     Dizzy or lightheaded 1.41 1 6 1.278 
     Drained 1.71 1 4 0.920 
     Empty or hollow 1.24 1 3 0.562 
     Energized 2.47 1 5 1.505 
     Exhausted 1.53 1 2 0.514 
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     Faintness 1.29 1 6 1.213 
     Feeling heavy 1.35 1 3 0.606 
     Feeling powerful 1.71 1 5 1.213 
     Feeling weak 1.41 1 4 0.870 
     Fidgety 3.88 1 7 1.833 
     Flushed / hot 1.94 1 5 1.197 
     Goosebumps 1.76 1 4 1.251 
     Headache 1.00 1 1 0.000 
     Heart increase 3.88 1 6 1.833 
     Heart palpitations 1.29 1 2 0.470 
     Heart pounding 2.47 1 6 1.807 
     Jittery 3.71 1 7 1.961 
     Knots or tension 1.88 1 5 1.219 
     Nausea 1.06 1 2 0.243 
     Numb 1.12 1 2 0.332 
     Pain 1.00 1 1 0.000 
     Pit in stomach 1.82 1 5 1.551 
     Rapid breath 1.18 1 4 0.728 
     Restless 2.94 1 7 1.983 
     Shaky 2.29 1 7 1.929 
     Shivering 1.41 1 5 1.064 
     Sick 1.12 1 2 0.332 
     Sluggish 1.47 1 3 0.624 
     Weary 1.82 1 5 1.131 
     Spine tingling 1.12 1 3 0.485 
     Stiffness 2.12 1 7 1.616 
     Stomach tense 1.65 1 6 1.412 
     Sweating 2.47 1 7 2.154 
     Throbbing 1.41 1 2 0.507 
     Tight chest 1.53 1 4 0.943 
     Tingling limbs 1.94 1 5 1.249 
     Turn pale 1.18 1 3 0.529 
     Turn red 1.88 1 5 1.409 
     Wide awake 3.00 1 6 1.620 
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Table 2.  Frequencies (in percentages) for self-reported experiences. 
Self Reported Experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Emotions    
     Activated 23.5% 0% 41.2% 5.9% 23.5% 5.9% 0% 
     Afraid 64.7% 17.6% 0% 11.8% 0% 5.9% 0% 
     Alert 11.8% 5.9% 17.6% 29.4% 23.5% 5.9% 5.9% 
     Amused 52.9% 17.6% 17.6% 0% 0% 17.6% 0% 
     Angry 52.9% 17.6% 17.6% 5.9% 0% 5.9% 0% 
     Annoyed 23.5% 29.4% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 11.8% 11.8% 
     Anxious 5.9% 23.5% 11.8% 17.6% 11.8% 17.6% 11.8% 
     Bored 52.9% 11.8% 5.9% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 
     Calm 29.4% 35.3% 23.5% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Content 52.9% 29.4% 11.8% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Disgusted 76.5% 11.8% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Distressed 35.3% 11.8% 29.4% 5.9% 5.9% 11.8% 0% 
     Embarrassed 23.5% 29.4% 5.9% 17.6% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 
     Excited 41.2% 29.4% 17.6% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 
     Frustrated 0% 41.2% 5.9% 23.5% 17.6 0% 11.8% 
     Guilty 88.2% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Happy 52.9% 35.3% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Hyperactive 35.3% 29.4% 17.6% 11.8% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Interested 41.2% 23.5% 11.8% 23.5% 0% 0% 0% 
     Irritable 35.3% 23.5% 11.8% 0% 5.9% 23.5% 0% 
     Panicky 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 5.9% 17.6% 0% 5.9% 
     Pleased 64.7% 11.8% 17.6% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Proud 41.2% 35.3% 17.6% 0% 0% 5.9% 0% 
     Quiet 88.2% 0% 0% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Relaxed 52.9% 23.5% 17.6% 4.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Sad 88.2% 5.9% 0% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Sleepy 47.1% 11.8% 29.4% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 
     Stressed 5.9% 17.6% 29.4% 5.9% 17.6% 5.9% 17.6% 
     Unhappy 41.2% 35.3% 0% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 
     Weary 41.2% 35.3% 5.9% 17.6% 0% 0% 0% 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Somatic Sensations    
     Blood Pumping 35.3% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 23.5% 17.6% 0% 
     Butterflies in stomach 47.1% 17.6% 17.6% 11.8% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Cold or clammy 47.1% 17.6% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 
     Dizzy or lightheaded 88.2% 0% 94.1% 0% 0% 5.9% 0% 
     Drained 52.9% 29.4% 11.8% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Empty or hollow 82.4% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Energized 41.2% 11.8% 17.6% 17.6% 11.8% 0% 0% 
     Exhausted 47.1% 52.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Faintness 94.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5.9% 0% 
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     Feeling heavy 70.6% 23.5% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Feeling powerful 64.7% 17.6% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Feeling weak 76.5% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Fidgety 11.8% 11.8% 23.5% 11.8% 17.6% 17.6% 5.9% 
     Flushed / hot 47.% 29.4% 1.8% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Goosebumps 70.6% 0% 11.8% 17.6% 0% 0% 0% 
     Headache 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Heart increase 11.8% 17.6% 11.8% 17.6% 11.8% 29.4% 0% 
     Heart palpitations 70.6% 29.4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Heart pounding 52.9% 5.9% 5.9% 17.6% 11.8% 5.9% 0% 
     Jittery 17.6% 17.6% 5.9% 17.6% 29.4% 0% 11.8% 
     Knots or tension 52.9 23.5% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Nausea 94.1% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Numb 88.2% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Pain 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Pit in stomach 76.5% 0% 0% 11.8% 11.8% 0% 0% 
     Rapid breath 94.1% 0% 0% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Restless 35.3% 11.8% 17.6% 17.6% 0% 11.8% 5.9% 
     Shaky 52.9% 17.6% 11.8% 0% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 
     Shivering 82.4% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Sick 88.2% 11.8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Sluggish 58.8% 35.3% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Spine tingling 94.1% 0% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Stiffness 47.1% 29.4% 5.9% 11.8% 0% 0% 5.9% 
     Stomach tense 76.5% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 5.9% 0% 
     Sweating 52.9% 17.6% 5.9% 0% 11.8% 0% 11.8% 
     Throbbing 58.8% 41.2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Tight chest 70.6% 11.8% 11.8% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 
     Tingling limbs 52.9% 17.6% 17.6% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 
     Turn pale 88.2% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Turn red 58.8% 23.5% 0% 5.9% 11.8% 0% 0% 
     Wide awake 23.5% 11.8% 35.3% 11.8% 5.9% 11.8% 0% 
     Weary 52.9% 23.5 17.6% 0% 5.9% 0% 0% 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for composite variables.  
Self Reported Experience Mean Min Max SD 
Emotions     
     Emotional intensity 2.371 1.670 3.470 0.543 
     Negative emotion mean 2.600 1.470 4.760 0.991 
     Positive emotion mean 1.921 1.110 2.780 0.541 
     High Negative Emotion  2.739 1.360 4.360 0.985 
     High Positive Emotion 2.671 1.000 4.000 0.982 
     Low Negative Emotion 2.029 1.000 4.750 0.968 
     Low Positive Emotion 1.779 1.000 3.250 0.706 
Somatic sensations     
     Somatic Intensity 1.888 1.000 3.020 0.598 
     Cardiac 2.721 1.000 4.750 1.386 
     Gastric 1.500 1.000 3.170 0.674 
     Respiratory 1.353 1.000 4.000 0.766 
     Kinesthetic 1.910 1.000 3.530 0.697 
     Temperature 1.951 1.000 3.500 0.770 
     General 2.177 1.000 3.500 0.661 
Concept knowledge     
     BAQ 3.880 2.390 5.610 0.805 
     MAIA 2.525 1.130 3.470 0.505 
     Interoceptive CK 2.862 1.170 4.090 0.656 
     Behavioral CK 2.924 1.140 4.260 0.714 
     Situational CK 2.952 1.110 4.070 0.608 
Individual differences     
     Emotional clarity 4.495 2.180 5.910 0.722 
     RDEES 4.454 2.140 5.860 0.833 
     Alexithymia 2.616 1.500 3.700 0.467 
     Somatization 1.579 1.000 3.530 0.487 
     Health behaviors 0.000 -1.240 0.730 0.499 
Note: HBD= Heartbeat Detection; BAQ= Body Awareness Questionnaire; 
MAIA=Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness; CK= concept knowledge	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Table 4. Frequencies for scores on the heartbeat detection task. 
Heartbeat accuracy  Number of participants  Percent of participants 
Ranged 50% or less 10 33% 
Ranged 50-70%  15 50% 
Ranged 70% or higher 5 17% 
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Table 5. Correlations between HBD scores and concept knowledge in session 1.  
 BAQ MAIA Interoceptive CK Behavior CK Situation CK 
HBD Score -.195 -.305† .306† .368* .332 
BAQ  .496** -.207 -.166 -.228 
MAIA   .052 -.058 -.034 
Interoceptive CK    .942** .894** 
Behavior CK     .888* 
Note: HBD= Heartbeat Detection; BAQ= Body Awareness Questionnaire; 
MAIA=Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness; CK= concept knowledge 
 †p< .10. * p< .05. ** p< .01. ***p< .001.  
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Table 6. Correlations of HBD with individual differences. 
  
 Emotion 
Clarity 
Mean 
RDEES 
Mean 
Health 
Behaviors 
Mean 
Somatization 
Mean 
Alexithymia 
Mean 
HBD Score -.071 .055 .097 .006 .218 
BAQ .190 .244 .322 .103 -.230 
MAIA .161 .423* -.073 .083 -.430* 
Interoceptive CK .163 .328 -.217 .021 -.102 
Behavior CK .196 .317 -.137 .119 -.039 
Situation CK .118 .202 -.215 .120 -.070 
Emotion Clarity Mean - .470** -.133 .033 -.553** 
RDEES Mean .470** - -.131 .155 -.484** 
Heath Behavior Mean .-133 -.131 - .164 .233 
Somatization Mean .033 .155 -.244 - -.105 
Alexithymia Mean -.553** -.484** .210 -.105 - 
Note: HBD= Heartbeat Detection; BAQ= Body Awareness Questionnaire; 
MAIA=Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness; CK= concept knowledge  
†p< .10. * p< .05. ** p< .01. ***p< .001.  
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Table 7. Correlations of HBD scores in Session 1 with Session 2 TSST.  
 
Note: CK= Concept Knowledge; SS= Somatic Sensation  
†p< .10. * p< .05. ** p< .01. ***p< .001.  
   
 HBD 
Score 
BAQ MAIA Interoceptive 
CK 
Behavior 
CK 
Situation 
CK 
Emotional Intensity .569* -.294 -.175 .657** .733** .609** 
High Arousal Mean .606* -.398 -.222 .616** .681** .561* 
Low Arousal Mean -.143 .155 -.036 .070 .072 .093 
Negative Mean .550* -.337 -.275 .520* .620** .499 
Positive Mean -.178 .192 .300 .231 .182 .180 
High Negative 
Mean 
.625** -.397 -.242 .638** .710** .605* 
High Positive Mean .350 -.252 --.023 .377 .358 .255 
Low Negative 
Mean 
.286 .019 -.149 .004 .119 -.015 
Low Positive Mean -.349 .139 .050 .172 .078 .145 
Somatic Intensity  .531* -.133 -.234 .604* .706** .585* 
SS Cardiac .400 -.089 -.014 .515* .572* .429 
SS Gastric .443 -.164 -.405 .341 .480 .402 
SS Respiratory  .550* -.240 -.480 .103 .216 .203 
SS Kinesthetic .605* -.270 -.266 .644** .751** .638** 
Temperature .151 .232 -.152 .381 .438 .323 
General Sensations .443 -.219 .088 .702** .719** .632** 
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Table 8. Individual differences correlations with Session 2 TSST. 
 Emotion 
Clarity 
Mean 
RDEES 
Mean 
Mean 
Health 
Behaviors 
Somatization 
Mean 
Alexithymia 
Mean 
Emotional Intensity .105 .187 -.033 .434 -.153 
High Arousal Mean .171 .052 -.087 .242 -.211 
Low Arousal Mean -.323 .263 .145 .636** .333 
Negative Mean .306 .028 -.062 .286 -.185 
Positive Mean -.462 .376 .100 .376 .116 
High Negative Mean .218 .020 -.124 .252 -.200 
High Positive Mean -.205 .243 .056 .084 -.198 
Low Negative Mean .263 .239 .204 .257 -.171 
Low Positive Mean -.472 .141 -.028 .487* .288 
Somatic Intensity  .552* .098 -.090 .183 -.320 
SS Cardiac .449 -.016 -.122 .194 -.340 
SS Gastric .665** -.009 -.059 -.098 -.230 
SS Respiratory  .438 -.124 .228 -.221 -.040 
SS Kinesthetic .476 .038 -.191 .159 -.271 
Temperature .472 .141 -.137 .165 -.189 
General Sensations .229 .286 -.223 .380 -.483* 
Note: SS= Somatic Sensation; CK= Concept Knowledge 
 †p< .10. * p< .05. ** p< .01. ***p< .001.  
47	  
Running head: EMOTION EMBODIMENT 
Table 9. Multiple regression analysis.  
Effect Estimate Standard 
Error 
p-values 
Model 1: Emotion Intensity   
Heartbeat detection score -.175 1.723 .962 
Interoceptive concept knowledge (IK) .111 5.44 .842 
HBD x IK .535 1.103 .637 
Model 2: Emotion Intensity   
Heartbeat detection score .375 3.017 .903 
Behavioral concept knowledge (BK) .272 .449 .556 
HBD x BK .221 .859 .801 
Model 3: Emotion Intensity   
Heartbeat detection score -.719 4.076 .863 
Situational concept knowledge (SK) -.006 .587 .993 
HBD x SK .660 1.202 .593 
†p< .10. * p< .05. ** p< .01. ***p< .001.  
 
  
 
 
